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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we show that public opinion variables have predictable effects on the 
outcomes of the third term bids that have occurred in the post-transition period in Africa. We 
focus on three public opinion variables that we believe to be critical in explaining variation 
across these outcomes: popular opposition to authoritarian rule, presidential popularity, and 
popular trust in the president.   
We use simple case comparisons to explain the effect of these variables on third term 
bids in Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia, and are able to predict outcomes 
based on the independent variables in all the countries except Uganda.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
Power, and its exercise, is a central concern of political theory. Liberal scholars, 
exemplified by Locke and Mill, argued for the need for institutional arrangements to limit the 
tyranny of power. Informed by the historical experience of absolute monarchs classical 
democratic theorists proposed demos kratia, “government of the people,” but they also 
worried about how to constrain the power of elected leaders especially the case of executive 
leaders who could claim a popular mandate (Federalist 10, 51). 
Presidential term limits are the contemporary solution for countries who desire a 
strong, effective executive, but who are wary of allowing such power to be exercised 
indefinitely by the same person (Linz, 1991). Term limits prescribe a set period of time during 
which a president can serve, typically two consecutive terms. 
The United States was the first Presidential constitution in the world and also the first 
country in the world to introduce presidential term limits. While arguments against the 
despotism of indefinite presid ntial terms were presented at the constitutional convention, 
they were rejected in the belief that Washington would be a trustworthy president who would 
serve indefinitely; yet Washington’s subsequent decision to decline to serve more than two 
presidential terms (Peabody 2001), created a powerful precedent and longstanding informal 
norm that was respected until Roosevelt’s decision to seek a third term in 1940.1 The Twenty-
Second amendment to the US constitution which established a formal, maximum two term 
limit for US presidents was subsequently passed in 1951.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Roosevelt was elected to four terms, the last beginning in 1944. 
2
 Source: http://www.termlimits.org/Current_Info/22nd-Amendment-text.html. Accessed October 2005. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, most of the new democratic regimes created after 1990 
included term limits in order to break the cycle of strong neopatrimonial systems of perpetual 
“big man rule” that became the norm in post-independence politics. Yet in Malawi, Namibia 
and Zambia Presidents Muluzi, Nujoma and Chiluba respectively, campaigned to amend their 
country’s constitutions to secure third terms. Their actions had a seismic effect on the political 
landscape, evidenced in party squabbles that led in all three countries to rifts between senior 
party members, and in Malawi and Namibia to the creation of new opposition parties from 
splinter groups of the ruling party (Baker 2002; VonDoepp 2005). The furore over term limits 
had hardly subsided in Malawi, Namibia and Zambia, when President Museveni of Uganda 
and President Obasanjo of Nigeria mooted third term bids in their own countries.
3
 
Public opposition to third terms in Africa has been led by a coalition of civil society 
organisations that had previously agitated for democratic reforms before democratic 
transition. The opponents of third term bids argue that they represent the slippery slope 
leading to the indefinite presidential autocracy that was the norm in post-independence Africa.  
Attempts to amend constitutionally mandated term limits are an example of the 
overreach of power contrary to democratic principles, but the paradox is that amendments can 
be done in accordance with the stipulations of the constitution. While van de Walle argues 
that the crux of the push for democratization in these hybrid regimes is epitomised by “the 
fight against rent-seeking and official abuses of power” (2002: 69), Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi assert that “in Africa today, civilian leaders who ignore the constitution pose a 
more insidious threat to democracy than coup plotters in the military” (2005: 1). 
Our research interest in third term situations comes from the belief that attempts to 
amend term limits are inherently undemocratic even though third terms are permissible 
                                                 
3
 Because these countries had two term limits for presidents, the issues raised have come  to be called Africa’s 
third term debates (Baker 2002; VonDoepp 2005). 
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provided the constitution is amended, a conundrum that illustrates the difficulty of trying to 
resolve normative political questions.  
With the crest of the third wave of democratic transitions having passed, the focus of 
democratic scholars has shifted to democratic consolidation, or the cementing of democratic 
regimes. Diamond (2007) argues that the central question of the field of democratic 
consolidation is the empirical question posed by Przeworski et al (1996): “what makes 
democracies endure.” The literature suggests that democratic consolidation can take place 
through institutionalisation, modernisation or legitimation. Though it may seem to be stating 
the obvious that this study assumes that public opinion is politically important, this is 
significant, as it reflects on democratic consolidation. 
Does presidential respect for term limits in countries with high popular opposition to 
authoritarian rule provide evidence of the legitimation of the regime through popular consent, 
evidence that the consideration of public opinion is becoming routinised in the way that we 
associate with democratic regimes? Or, is it the institutionalisation of the disincentives 
represented by term limits that ensures they are respected by incumbent presidents? 
In shedding some light on institutionalisation, this study also contributes to the debate 
on whether to classify regimes based on their democratic characteristics, or degree of 
institutionalisation.
4
 Bratton and van de Walle argue that three critical informal institutions - 
clientelism, corruption and “big man” presidentialism - “are so ingrained in African political 
life as to constitute veritable political institutions” (2007: 98). They call these chimeras, states 
in which informal rules coexist with informal rules, “hybrid regimes” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997; van de Walle 2003). On the other hand, Posner and Young argue that a focus on 
institutionalization, by which they mean the “constraints on executive power” (2007: 137), 
rather than a focus on democracy, provides the best way to classify African regimes. 
                                                 
4
 Since the Afrobarometer surveys on which this research is based are only conducted in countries where 
eliciting public opinion is not seen as a threat to the regime, it is arguable that the political importance of public 
opinion is, in and of itself, an indicator that a country is democratic. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
7 
 
It is now customary for countries’ democratic practices to be in the international 
spotlight during general elections, as attention is focused on the expression of the popular 
will. The same has been true for third term situations. Good governance and the rule of law 
are leitmotifs for aid donors and democracy practitioners in the field. In increasing our 
understanding of third term situations, which are a bellwether for the state of democracy, this 
study will hopefully assert the importance of the will of the people.    
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CHAPTER TW0 
 
Review of the Literature 
The politics of third term bids have occupied many column inches in newspapers 
across Africa, yet only a few scholars have explicitly examined presidential behaviour with 
regard to term limits, or tried to explain the outcomes of third term bids (Baker 2002, von 
Doepp 2005; Posner and Young 2007, McKie 2008).  
The “big man rule” (Mattes, Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Hyden 2006) for which 
sub-Saharan Africa is infamous originated in autochthonous traditions of patrimonial rule 
(Theobold 1982, Roth 1968) which were co-opted during the colonial interregnum (Mamdani 
1996) and remained largely unchanged after independence (Chazan et al 1999; Herbst 2000), 
as leaders sought recourse to tradition and personal rule in order to centralise and consolidate 
power and secure legitimacy (Nwabuzue 1974; H. Kwasi Prempeh: 2008).  
Not surprisingly the premium placed on authority and legitimacy has influenced the 
choice of executive in post-colonial and post-transition African states: with the exception of 
just three parliamentary regimes, Africa’s governments are all presidential regimes. 
Presidential regimes have a directly elected executive which results in presidentialism, which 
is national politics dominated both by the institution of the presidency and the individual 
occupying the office (Linz 1991), or the concentration of power in the hands of one individual 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Both are agreed, however, on the personalisation of the 
office of the president.  
The overwhelming body of literature holds that personal rule is central to 
understanding African politics (Bayart 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Chabal 1994; 
Chabal 1999; Hyden 2006; Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Kirk-Greene 1991; van de Walle 
2003). Personal rule, memorably called “the politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) and “the 
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economy of affection” (Hyden 2006), manifests itself in the use of state resources, 
clientelism, and corruption (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bratton 2007). 
Neopatrimonialism refers to the existence of these particularist practices within the 
bureaucratic state.  Van de Walle (2003) contends that presidentialism and clientelism in 
Africa’s post-transition regimes mean that these systems are weakly institutionalised, as there 
is a tension between democratic institutions and big man rule (Joseph 2008; Diamond 2008). 
Since legitimacy in the neopatrimonial state is bought through patronage and not 
institutionalisation the neopatrimonial regime literature suggests that clientelist networks are 
too valuable to give up: presidents need to stay in office to enjoy power, privilege and 
prosperity while their clients need them to remain in office to continue delivering 
particularistic goods (Bayart 1999; Chabal 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bratton 2007). This 
strongly suggests that elected presidents should naturally attempt to circumvent or change 
term limits. Indeed, we would expect formal, legal, paper limitations on presidential “big 
man” power, like presidential term limits, to be circumvented, ignored, or literally torn up.  
However, recent scholarship provides evidence against the conventional wisdom, and 
suggests that formal rules are attaining increasing importance in African politics. Posner and 
Young (2007) show that as power is being increasingly institutionalised presidential term 
limits are being observed: big man rule in Africa is not as important as it once was. Lindberg 
(2007) finds that elections in Africa are increasing in competitiveness and importance.  
Despite this shift in emphasis from informal to formal rules, the consensus remains 
that there is an interplay between formal and informal rules, the defining characteristic of 
Africa’s “hybrid regimes” (van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 2003); and that formal 
institutionalisation is taking place, even as informal institutionalisation remains a feature of 
African political organisation (Joseph 2008; H Kwasi Prempeh 2007).   
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Bratton et al (2005) and Posner and Young (2007) do share common ground in one 
area, however: both argue that public opinion is becoming an important factor in determining 
political outcomes in Africa. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that transitions from 
neopatrimonial regimes are not elite driven, but driven by protests from below: if the actions 
of mass publics have an effect on authoritarian regimes, it is not that great a leap to 
hypothesize that mass public opinion would have an effect on Africa’s post-transitions 
democratically elected leaders. Bratton et al (2005) hypothesise that “public opinion can be 
both a cause and a consequence of [political] change” (2005: 1), and like  Diamond (2007) 
contend   that public opinion played a role in determining the outcome of the third term 
debates in Namibia in 1998 and Zambia in 2001.  
Of the existing literature on third terms in Africa, Baker (2002) details the progress of 
the “third term debates” in Namibia, Zambia and Malawi, and the arguments of the 
protagonists from the ruling party and the opposition and civil society, but does not attempt to 
explain outcomes, while Von Doepp (2005) argues that the cohesiveness of the ruling party is 
critical to explaining the outcome of the third term bids of President Nujoma of Namibia, 
President Chiluba of Zambia and President Muluzi of Malawi. As yet, no study has provided 
empirical evidence of the effect of public opinion on third term bids.  This study is a first 
attempt to fill that gap. We start by outlining our hypotheses. 
 
Hypotheses 
When a sitting president nears the end of the second term a number of outcomes are 
possible. The first is when no attempt at a third term bid takes place; the second is the tabling 
of a bill in the national assembly to amend term limits as stipulated in the constitution, and the 
third is the success or failure of such a bill when put to a vote in the national assembly.  
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This study focuses on three public opinion variables that we believe to be critical in 
explaining variation across these outcomes: popular opposition to authoritarian rule, 
presidential popularity, and popular trust in the president.  We make two major assumptions: 
the first is that public opinion is transmitted to the executive through the news media or 
through members of their party who are either legislators or party officials; and the second is 
that presidents, party officials and legislators are aware of what voters think of the president, 
and are rational political actors cognizant of the costs and benefits of actions which have an 
impact on the voting public.  
During Africa’s transitions extensive support for democracy existed in the 
independent media, voluntary associations and individuals unified in their opposition to 
authoritarian rule and the life-presidency that was then the rule rather than the exception. 
Subsequently many of these non-governmental organisations remained opposed to 
governments on matters of democracy and human rights. These coalitions were re-mobilised 
during the course of the third term debates to oppose the reversal of term limits, the one 
constitutional provision that kept life-presidents from becoming a reality once again (Baker 
2002). 
Opponents of third term bids argued that removing term limits was the first step in a 
return to life presidency, as the combination of incumbency advantage and personal rule 
would stifle meaningful competition for the executive over time (Baker 2002). This is not 
surprising given the widespread antipathy to autocratic rule during the transition to democracy 
and the short time since transition in many countries. We use opposition to one-man rule as an 
indicator of opposition to the removal of term limits.  
Opposition to one-man rule is probably the most important element of public opinion 
because it represents the clearest constraint to the success of a third term bid, if we assume 
that legislators in the national assembly are rational actors that consider the pros and cons of 
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voting for a constitutional amendment bill that removes term limits. If their constituents are 
opposed to one man rule, and thus a bill amending term limits, then it is conceivable that a 
legislator who votes in favour of a third term bill will not be re-elected. Even in a political 
system where patronage is important, it is logical that MPs will put their own political 
survival before that of their president. Hence we expect third term bids to succeed when 
opposition to one-man rule is low, and to fail when opposition to one-man rule is high. 
Just as a popular incumbent president ending their first term and seeking re-election 
for a second would be confident of their chances of re-election, it makes sense that a president 
seeking a third term would feel confident to do so if they were popular. A popular president 
would have a credible argument to make to leadership contenders within his own party, 
legislators in his party, and the nation, that to offer him a third term would be a good thing. It 
is also feasible that if the president is very popular legislators will be less likely to oppose 
amending of the constitution; opposition legislators might not want to be seen to be going 
against the wishes of the people, while members of the president’s party would not want to 
oppose their political patron. For the legislator it is a win-win situation because they can ride 
the electoral coattails of a popular president.  
We expect third term bids to succeed when presidential approval is high and to fail 
when presidential approval is low. We expect the effect of presidential trust on outcomes to 
be the same as that for approval of presidential performance. Although we have good logical 
reasons to assume that the relationship between outcomes and presidential trust would be the 
same as for presidential approval, we did not deduce a hypothesis from the positions of the 
protagonists in the third term debates as we did with opposition to one-man rule and 
presidential approval.  
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The hypotheses are summarised in Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1. Summary of predictions 
 Bid 
Failure 
Bid 
Success 
Opposition to one-man rule High Low 
Presidential approval Low High 
Presidential trust Low High 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
Source of Data 
This paper uses public opinion data collected by Afrobarometer. The Afrobarometer is 
a comparative series of national surveys of public attitudes on democracy, markets and civil 
society in Africa. It is a joint enterprise of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) and the Institute for Empirical 
Research in Political Economy (IREEP, Benin). Since 1999, Afrobarometer has accumulated 
interviews with over 105,000 Africans, conducting four rounds of surveys in 12 of those 20 
countries.  
Respondents are selected using a random, stratified, multistage, national probability 
sample representing adult citizens aged 18 years or older. Each country sample yields a 
margin of error of ±3 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level. The pooled, cross-
country sample is equally weighted to standardize national samples at 1200 respondents 
apiece.
5
  
 
The Data Sample 
The universe of possible cases is those countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a directly 
elected president and a constitutional limit on the number of consecutive terms that the 
president can serve. Afrobarometer surveys, however, are only conducted in countries that are 
sufficiently stable to allow for the smooth running of the surveys, and sufficiently democratic 
that the government allows public opinion surveys to be conducted without interference. The 
population is thus considerably smaller than the universe of possible cases suggests. In each 
case the corresponding data is drawn from the Afrobarometer survey that was conducted 
                                                 
5
 Afropaper No124, p. 3. For more information, see: www.afrobarometer.org.  
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during the constitutionally prescribed second elected term of the president.  The sample of 16 
cases is shown in Figure 3.1. The cases in which third term bids took place – Malawi, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe - are highlighted in bold text.  
 
Figure 3.1. Sample of Cases 
 Country President Second Term 
Duration 
Afrobarometer Survey Dates 
(Afrobarometer round) 
1 Botswana Mogae 2004 - 2009 May 28 – June 12, 2005 (3) 
2 Cape Verde Neves 2001 - 2006 June 3 – June 14, 2002 (2) 
3 Ghana Rawlings 1996 – 2000 29 Aug – Sept 11, 2002 (3) 
4 Ghana Kuffuor 2004 - 2008 Mar 10 – Mar 21, 2005 (3) 
5 Kenya Kibaki 2007 - 2012 Oct 29 – Nov 17, 2008 (4) 
6 Malawi Muluzi 1999 - 2004 Apr 29 – May 18, 2003 (2) 
7 Mali Konare 1997 - 2002 Jan - Feb, 2001 (1) 
8 Mali Toure 2007 - 2012 Dec 15 – Dec 31, 2008 (4) 
9 Mozambique Chissano 1999 - 2004 Aug 11 – Aug 21, 2002 (2) 
10 Namibia  Nujoma 1994 - 1999 Sep – Oct, 1999 (1) 
11 Namibia  Nujoma 1999 - 2004 Aug 15 – Sept 28, 2003 (2) 
12 Nigeria Obasanjo 2003 - 2007 Aug 28 – Dec 31, 2005 (3) 
13 Senegal Wade 2007 - 2014 May 19 – Jun 4, 2008 (4) 
14 Tanzania Mkapa 2000 - 2005 July 5 – Aug 6, 2003 (2) 
15 Uganda  Museveni 2001 - 2006 Aug 13 – Sep 5, 2002 (2) 
16 Zambia Chiluba 1996 - 2001 Oct – Nov, 1999 (1) 
 
 
Operationalisation of the concepts 
 To determine opposition to one-man rule, the Afrobarometer questionnaire asked 
respondents: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of 
the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that 
the President/Prime Minister can decide everything?
6
  
 To determine presidential approval, respondents were asked: Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve 
months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: [President/Prime Minister’s name]?7  
                                                 
6
 Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 Questionnaire. 
7
 Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 Questionnaire. 
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To determine presidential trust, respondents were asked: How much do you trust each 
of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime 
Minister?
8
  
   
Analysis Plan 
In order to determine what explains whether or not a third term bid is successful we 
conduct bivariate analyses of our independent variables – opposition to one-man rule, 
presidential approval and presidential trust against third term bid outcomes, namely bid 
success and failure. Recall that our hypotheses predicted outcomes based on the level (low or 
high) of the independent variables.  
In the cases in this study - Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia – a 
constitutional amendment bill requires a two thirds majority vote in parliament to pass. 
Legislators acting as representatives of their constituents should fulfil the wishes of those 
constituents. It follows therefore that a parliamentary vote parallels the aggregated interests of 
constituents as represented by legislators in parliament. We thus used the supermajority of 
sixty- six percent as the cutoff between low and high levels of the independent variable 
aggregated at the country level.  
 
  
                                                 
8
 Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 Questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Descriptives 
We begin this chapter by describing the distribution of the dependent and independent 
variables. Despite the attention that they garner from democracy watchers, third term bid 
attempts in Africa’s republican democracies are rare (Figure 4.1).  
In the population from which the sample is drawn there was no third term attempt in 
11 cases. Third term bids occurred in only five cases, of which two were successful.  
 
Figure 4.1. Third Term Outcomes 
Outcome Cases 
No attempt  Botswana, Cape Verde , Ghana (1),  
Ghana (2), Kenya, Mali (1), Mali (2),  
Mozambique, Namibia (2), Senegal, Tanzania  
Bid fails  Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia  
Bid succeeds   Namibia (1) , Uganda 
Note: Ghana, Mali and Namibia have had two third term events each, indicated by  
the (1) and (2) in parentheses after the country name. 
 
 
We now proceed to describe the distribution of the independent variables in our 
sample. Opposition to one-man rule ranges from a low of 46 percent in Mozambique to a high 
of 92 percent in Tanzania (Figure 4.2). The mean level of opposition to one-man rule is 77 
percent. 
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Figure 4.2. Opposition to one-man rule 
 
  
 
Presidential approval ranges from 29 percent in Senegal to 91 percent in Namibia. The 
sample mean is 70 percent (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3. Presidential approval 
 
 
 
 
 
Presidential trust is lowest in Cape Verde, at 23 percent, and highest in Tanzania at 88 
percent, while the mean for the sample is 64 percent (Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4. Presidential trust 
 
 
 
Bivariate Analysis 
We begin the bivariate analysis by looking at the effect of the level of opposition to 
one-man rule on third term bid outcome (Figure 4.5).  The hypothesis that third term bids are 
unsuccessful when opposition to one-man rule is high is confirmed in three cases and not in 
one. The hypothesis that third term bids are successful when opposition to one-man rule is 
low is confirmed in one case.  
Figure 4.5. Opposition to one-man rule and outcome 
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High  
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Succeeds 
 
 
Namibia [57%] 
 
 
 
 
Uganda [ 90%] 
 
 
 
 
Bid 
Fails 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malawi [78%] 
Nigeria [74%] 
Zambia [91%] 
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The hypothesis that third term bids are successful when presidential approval is high is 
confirmed in two cases (Figure 4.6). The hypothesis that third term bids are unsuccessful 
when presidential approval is low is confirmed in three cases.  
 
Figure 4.6. Presidential approval and outcome 
  
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
Bid 
Succeeds 
 
 
 
 
Namibia [79%] 
Uganda [80%] 
 
 
 
 
Bid 
Fails 
 
 
Malawi [ 65%] 
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We complete the bivariate analysis by turning to the relationship between presidential 
trust and third term bid outcome (Figure 4.7). The hypothesis that third term bids are 
successful when trust in the president is high is confirmed in one case. The hypothesis that 
third term bids are unsuccessful when trust in the president is low is confirmed in three cases 
but not in one case. 
 
Figure 4.7. Trust in the president and outcome 
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Discussion of Results 
The distributions of the independent variables hinted at some of the relationships that 
we hypothesized and proceeded to test with bivariate analysis. The third term bid succeeded 
in Namibia where opposition to one-man rule was relatively low. Third term bids in Nigeria 
and Malawi were unsuccessful, in the face of higher levels of opposition to one-man rule. It is 
surprising though, that the third term bid in Uganda was successful despite the highest level of 
opposition to one-man rule in the sample. 
Third term bids in an environment with low presidential approval as was the case in 
Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi failed; conversely presidential approval was relatively high in 
Uganda and Namibia, where third term bids were successful.  
In Nigeria and Malawi failed third term bids occurred in an environment of low trust 
in the president. In Namibia where the third term bid was successful trust in the president was 
relatively high, yet the opposite occurred in Uganda where the third term bid succeeded 
despite relatively low levels of trust in the president. 
We deduced the hypotheses tested in the bivariate analysis from the arguments of the 
protagonists in the countries in which third term bids took place.  The main argument 
marshaled by opponents of third term bids was that amending term limits amounted to 
endorsing one man rule. In alluding to the slide to autocracy that occurred after independence 
in many of these countries, it was a powerful argument to make, particularly given the 
newness of Africa’s democratic transitions.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, that we 
thought opposition to one man rule would be the most important predictor of the outcome of 
third term events and had the most confidence in generating hypotheses for the outcomes of 
third term bids for low and high levels of opposition to one-man rule.  
The main argument of supporters of third term bids was that the president was doing a 
good job - in some instances going as far as to claim there was no other candidate who could 
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do the job that the president was doing - and should be allowed to continue to do so. Although 
weakened by being a partisan argument, it made sense, and we also felt confident in 
generating hypotheses for the outcomes of third term bids for low and high levels of 
presidential approval. Logically trust in the present seemed a corollary of presidential 
approval, so we thought the effect of either variable on bid outcomes would be the same.  
A summary of the results of the bivariate analysis is shown in Figure 4.8. Figures in 
bold indicate that the outcome for the level of the variable was as predicted, i.e. that the 
hypothesis was confirmed. We were able to correctly predict the outcome of the third term bid 
given the level of opposition to one-man rule in four out of five instances. We correctly 
predicted bid outcome using the level of presidential approval in five out of five instances; 
and the bid outcome given the level of presidential trust in four out of five instances. 
 
Figure 4.8. Overview of Cases, Outcomes and Variable Values 
 Bid 
Outcome 
Opposition to 
one-man rule 
(%) 
Presidential 
approval (%) 
Trust in the 
president (%) 
Malawi Fail 78 65 48 
Namibia Succeed 57 79 73 
Nigeria Fail 74 30 24 
Uganda  Succeed 90 80 60 
Zambia Fail 91 64 38 
 
Contrary to what we expected, we find that presidential approval, and not opposition 
to one-man rule, is the best predictor of third term outcomes. High and low levels of 
presidential approval presaged bid success and failure in all cases. Levels of opposition to 
one-man rule and trust in the president corroborate our hypotheses for all cases except one.  
Table 4.8 can also be interpreted in another way. If, instead of reading down the 
columns containing the variables we read across the rows containing the cases we see that the 
only case in which public opinion did not predict the outcome of the third term bid was 
Uganda. Uganda has similar levels of presidential approval to Namibia, but has, by some 
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margin, the highest levels of opposition to one-man rule of the four countries in which a third 
term bid was attempted.   
In other words, opposition to one-man rule, presidential approval and trust in the 
president correctly predict the outcome of the third term bid in four out of the five countries 
where such bids took place.  We think this interpretation of the results of the bivariate analysis 
is more compelling, and offers up an interesting avenue of further inquiry: why does 
presidential approval temper the impact of such high levels of opposition to one-man rule in 
Uganda? 
We finish this chapter by couching our analysis of the impact of our three independent 
variables within a broader democratic context. Bratton et al construct a demand and supply 
model to explain the consolidation of democratic regimes in Africa (Bratton et al, 2005). In 
the model the demand for democracy in a country is made up of the percentage of people who 
both express support for democracy and also reject three authoritarian alternatives (one-party 
rule, one-man rule and military rule). The supply of democracy is the percentage of the 
population that is satisfied with the way democracy works in the country and also thinks the 
country is democratic.  
Opposition to one-man rule thus feeds directly into this demand and supply model of 
democracy. As for presidential approval and presidential trust, Bratton et al find that an 
additive construct of presidential approval and trust in the president is linearly related with 
aggregated rates of satisfaction with democracy (Bratton et al, 2005: 245). 
Opposition to one-man rule, presidential approval and presidential trust are important 
components of measures of intrinsic attachments to democracy and empirical assessments of 
democracy captured in the democratic demand supply model.  
Countries where opposition to one man rule is high and presidential approval and trust 
in the president are low, should also be countries where the demand for democracy exceeds 
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citizen’s perceptions of its supply. These are countries where the legitimacy of the 
government is low, meaning the demand for political accountability is high, and citizens 
expect their leaders to behave democratically. As a result the likelihood of success of a third 
term bid in such a country is low.  
Conversely, where opposition to one-man rule is low and presidential approval and 
trust in the president are high, or countries where the supply of democracy exceeds the 
demand of citizens for it, the chances of success of a third term bid is high. In these countries 
the legitimacy of the government is not in question as the leadership provides more 
democracy than the people want, meaning constraints on executive power are not politically 
salient; a third term bid can literally fly under the radar, as was the case in Namibia.  
We calculated the demand and supply of democracy as well as the difference between 
the demand for democracy and its supply for the five cases (Figure 4.9).   
Figure 4.9. Demand and supply of democracy and third term outcome 
Case Demand for 
Democracy 
(percent) 
Supply of 
Democracy 
(percent) 
Demand - 
Supply 
(percent) 
Democratic 
Category 
Third Term 
Outcome 
Nigeria 45 16 29 Demand-driven Fail 
Malawi 39 27 12 
Zambia 59 47 12 
Uganda  35 44 -9 Supply-driven Succeed 
Namibia  26 53 -27 
 
Table 4.9 confirms that third term bids failed in demand-driven countries, where the 
demand for democracy exceeds the supply, and the legitimacy of the government is low; and 
succeeded in supply-driven countries, where the supply of democracy exceeds demand, and 
the legitimacy of government is high.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Importance of Context 
The preceding chapter showed that opposition to one-man rule, presidential approval 
and residential trust aggregated at the country level predicted the outcomes of third term bids 
in four of five cases. This macro level analysis showed that the effect of opposition to one-
man rule, an otherwise reliable predictor of bid outcome, was tempered by presidential 
approval in once instance, suggesting that the national context within which the third term bid 
took place was a key factor.  
We ended the analysis with a discussion of the demand for and supply of democracy at 
the national level. We find that third term bids succeeded in the two cases where regime 
legitimacy was high (Namibia and Uganda) and failed in the three cases where regime 
legitimacy was low (Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia). We now look in more detail at the course 
of the third term debates in our five cases, starting with Namibia.  
 
Namibia 
Namibia was the first democratic country in the region to experience a third term bid. 
Sam Nujoma won a second term as president of Namibia in 1994. Unlike other countries in 
which third term bids took place, as we will subsequently see, the campaign in Namibia was a 
relatively muted affair. There were a number of  reasons for this.  
The first and most important is the position of Swapo in Namibia’s consciousness. In 
1972 the United Nations General Assembly recognized Swapo as the sole legitimate 
representative of the people of Namibia. Swapo guerillas fought a long civil war against the 
South African troops occupying the country, and laid legitimate claim to be the movement 
that liberated the country.  Secondly, the long-time Swapo leader Sam Nujoma was seen as 
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the father of the Namibian nation. The high esteem in which Nujoma was held meant that 
there was no mass public  campaign against the third term bid. Finally, Swapo possessed the 
two thirds majority in the national assembly required to change the constitution. As a result, 
according to Namibian political scientist and Swapo member Henning Melber the decision 
was Swapo’s to make regardless of opposition.9   
The May 1997 Swapo congress decided to allow Nujoma to stand for three terms. The 
argument advanced was that since he had been appointed by the constituent assembly in 1999 
he had only actually been elected once. Senior Swapo figure and Ambassador to London Ben 
Ulenga resigned from Swapo in protest at the decision, and later went on to start the Congress 
of Democrats opposition political party.  
The Namibian Constitution First Amendment Bill was passed in the National Council 
by 19 votes to 4 on November 20, 1998.
10
 Swapo’s majority in the lower house meant that the 
vote passed without incident.  
 
Zambia 
Frederick Chiluba’s third term bid in Zambia was notable by the overtness of the 
campaign and the extent to which it polarized the country. Chiluba made no secret of his 
desire for a third term. Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) leaders in the districts 
canvassed extensively to drum up support, particularly from chiefs and other traditional 
leaders. In February 2001, Vernon Mwanga, MMD Secretary General said that Chiluba 
wished for an open debate on the third term, a sentiment that Chiluba echoed in a speech to 
church leaders when he said [tongue in cheek] that not allowing debate on the third term 
would be undemocratic.
11
   
                                                 
9
 http://www.newera.com.na/article.php?articleid=7954.  Accessed 7-2-11.  
10
 http://www.mg.co.za/article/1998-11-20-nujoma-third-term-passed.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
11
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1162462.stm.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
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Opposition to the move came from many parts of civil society. After a meeting in 
January 2001 leaders from the Christian Council of Zambia, the Evangelical Fellowship of 
Zambia and the Zambia Episcopal Conference issued a statement condemning the third term 
bid , calling it “unconstitutional and undemocratic.”12 The Zambian labour movement, which 
Frederick Chiluba had once led in challenging the autocratic rule of Kenneth Kaunda, was 
also opposed. Derrick Chaala, the General Secretary of Zambia’s Trade Union Confederation 
said: "history has taught us that the continued stay of presidents in office has built them into 
dictators and that dictators often survive by resorting to large scale abuse”13  
The Church, the Law Association of Zambia and the Non-Governmental Coordinating 
Committee formed OASIS, a civil society umbrella body to lead opposition to the third term. 
Civil society demonstrations were organized in Lusaka and major urban areas, where Chiluba 
did not enjoy as much support as he did in rural areas. It was in Eastern province that Chiluba 
declared on April 6 that he was “determined to fight on and win the battle against those 
opposed to my third term."
14
  
The bid split provinces and senior leadership of the MMD in the run-up to the MMD 
national convention in 2001. Four out of Zambia’s nine provinces supported the bid. MMD 
National Secretary Michael Sata was a strong proponent of the constitutional change, while 
Ackson Sejani the party’s chairman for elections was opposed.15 Chiluba’s Vice President 
Christon Tembo became a major figurehead of the opposition, famous for addressing their 
rallies. MMD Vice President Godfrey Miyanda and Chiluba’s wife Vera Chiluba were also 
against the bid, prompting jokes about Chiluba’s marital troubles among the opposition.16  
A special MMD convention to amend the party’s constitution to allow Chiluba to 
stand again was convened on May 1, 2001.  A ban by Chiluba on campaigning against the bid 
                                                 
12
 http://afcast.org.zw/index.php/the-third-term-bid-by-president-chiluba.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
13
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/04/chrismcgreal.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
14
 http://afcast.org.zw/index.php/the-third-term-bid-by-president-chiluba.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
15
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1162462.stm.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
16
 http://www.afrol.com/News2001/zam003_chiluba_3_term.htm.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
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led to 200 party members boycotting the convention.  Violence at the convention saw people, 
including three cabinet members, beaten up by Chiluba supporters. The MMD moved to expel 
members who had boycotted the convention but this move was prevented by a High Court 
injunction.
17
  
The battle within the MMD having been won, the MMD now brought the 
constitutional amendment to the national parliament. Opposition to the amendment in the 
legislature was led by MMD Vice President Christon Tembo, who laid out plans in the 
legislature to impeach the president for his actions. 
Despite the MMD majority in parliament (131 seats), 80 out of 158 MPS in parliament 
signed a declaration of opposition to the constitutional amendment. MMD Vice President 
Christon Tembo led plans in the legislature to impeach the president. In response Chiluba 
threatened that they would lose their seats.  
Chiluba announced at a press conference on 4 May 2001 that he would not stand again 
for election as president. There was skepticism at this announcement especially since he had 
the day previously expelled his Vice President and eight other cabinet members from the 
MMD party for opposing his third term plans.
18
 Despite the announcement the battles had 
split the MMD irrevocably, as 80 MMD members resigned from the Executive Committee.
19
  
 
Malawi.  
Zambia’s neighbor Malawi was the next country to experience a third term debate. 
Political observers noted that true to form, what happens politically in Zambia follows soon 
afterward in Malawi (autocratic Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda was forced to concede to 
democratic demands just before Kamuzu Banda of Malawi had to do the same).  
                                                 
17
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/04/chrismcgreal.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
18
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/07/chrismcgreal.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
19
 http://www.afrol.com/News2001/zam006_mmd_splits.htm.  Accessed 7-2-2011.  
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Bakili Muluzi won re-election for a second term in Malawi’s general election of June 
1999. Within two years an unofficial campaign was underfoot within the ruling United 
Democratic Front (UDF) party to secure a third term for him. The president, while not stating 
his own position on the issue, did not discourage the campaign.  In January 2001 in the first 
official comment on the issue Clement Stambuli Minister of Information said on national 
radio that the issue had not been commented on at cabinet level.
20
  
In May 2001 the leadership of one of the largest ecumenical gatherings in the country, 
the CCAP, issued a lengthy pastoral letter that detailed the governance shortcomings of the 
Muluzi administration. In strongly worded language referring to the third term murmurings, 
the letter accused the Muluzi government of the “rape of the constitution.”21 The CCAP 
pastoral letter set the stage for an increasingly tense standoff between civil society and the 
government over the third term issue. The stance the church took in issuing a pastoral letter 
had great significance because of the precedent set by a pastoral letter from the Catholic 
bishops in Malawi denouncing the authoritarian excesses of the Kamuzu Banda regime. This 
letter entered popular lore as the signal that marked the beginning of the end of the Banda 
regime. The pastoral letter also presaged a split on the Muluzi third term issue on religious 
lines, as Islamic religious organisations came out in support of Muluzi. This was notable since 
religion had not previously been a divisive factor in Malawi politics. Indeed, Muluzi, a 
Muslim, was elected president despite the country being predominantly Christian.  
Civil society organisations grouped together to form an umbrella body to oppose the 
third term in 2002, called the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution. Former Malawi Vice 
President Cassim Chilumpha was a member of the leadership of the FDC. He had been fired 
from the cabinet by the president in November 2001 over allegations that he had been 
involved in corrupt tendering procedures when Minister of Education. Another Minister 
                                                 
20
 http://208.106.251.104/Report.aspx?ReportID=16688. Accessed 7-2-2011. 
21
 http://allafrica.com/stories/200105140450.html.   Accessed 7-2-2011. 
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named in the same report by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Minister of Transport Brown 
Mpinganjira, was also sacked from the cabinet and went on to form an opposition party called 
the National Democratic Alliance.  
The adversarial relationship between the independent media and the government, 
which the government felt was biased towards the opposition, worsened during the third term 
campaign. In February 2002 the editor and a number of journalists of The Chronicle 
newspaper were beaten by members of the UDF Young Democrats, the party’s youth militia. 
In May 2002 the International NGO Committee to Protect Journalists reported that the offices 
of the publishers of two large independent newspapers The Malawi News and The Daily 
Times were barricaded by UDF supporters protesting the papers’ anti-third term stance.   
In May 2002 Muluzi banned demonstrations around the third term. An application for 
an interdict on the ban was made to the High Court which declared in June 2002 that the ban 
was unconstitutional. In response, Muluzi said he would ignore the court decision. In an 
interesting twist of fate, Justice Mwaungulu, the author of the High Court verdict, had 
previously been the target of a UDF attempt to impeach him and two other judges in 2001 for 
being biased against the government
22
  
When the Constitutional Amendment Bill was presented to parliament the bill failed to 
pass by only three votes.
23
 The defeat was a surprise, as the government thought it had 
convinced enough opposition MPs to vote in favour. On July 5 2002 Muluzi announced to the 
nation that he would respect the parliamentary vote. 
However the third term campaign continued under another guise. Rather than a third 
term bill, the president’s supporters mooted the idea of an open term bill instead, which would 
remove term limits altogether. A 2,000-strong march in Blantyre, in January 2003 as 
parliament began debating the open terms bill was dispersed by police with teargas.  In 
                                                 
22
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2024844.stm.  Accessed 7-2-2011. 
23
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2096691.stm. Accessed 7-2-2011. 
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February 2003 the Minister of Justice obtained a court order banning further protests planned 
by the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution.
24
  
In the face of continued, widespread public opposition to the bill the Minister of 
Justice referred the open terms bill to the Justice Committee of parliament for comment. This 
was interpreted as a face-saving way for the government to allow the bill to die a natural 
death. However, the third term campaign only came to a definitive end with the 
announcement by Muluzi on April 2, 2003 that the UDF Congress had decided that Bingu wa 
Mutharika would be its presidential candidate in the 2004 general elections.
25
  
 
Uganda  
Yoweri Museveni entered Kampala at the head of a rebel army, the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) that overthrew Milton Obote’s government in 1986. In a bid to 
restore stability to a country that had suffered from years of civil war and brutal dictatorship, 
the NRA morphed into the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and effectively banned all 
meaningful activity by political parties, which were allowed to register, but could not hold 
public meetings nor campaign for their candidates.  
Museveni won the 1996 election and in the NRM manifesto for the 2001 election 
declared that the second term he was then seeking would be his last (the post-civil war 
constitution that was adopted in 1995 prescribed a two term limit for the president). 
However, in March 2003 the NRM national conference resolved to remove 
presidential tem limits. Despite this decision, there was opposition from prominent members 
within the movement to extending Museveni’s time in office. In May 2003 in a cabinet 
reshuffle, Museveni dismissed ministers who had publicly expressed their opposition to the 
                                                 
24
 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2003-02-17-malawi-bars-demos-against-muluzis-third-term-bid.  Accessed 7-2-
2011.  
25
 http://www.aegis.org/news/ips/2003/IP030401.html.  Accessed 7-2-2011. 
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constitutional amendment. These former ministers – Eriya Kategaya, Bidandi Ssali and Miria 
Matembe – went on to spearhead the campaign against the third term.  
Despite these clear machinations behind the scenes towards securing the amendment, 
Museveni was publicly opaque on the issue. In delivering his state of the nation address to 
parliament on 5 June 2003, he chided interest in the campaign to remove presidential terms as 
mere politicking, saying that his main concern was the state of security in the north of the 
country.
26
   
In September 2003 the cabinet decided to push for an amendment to the constitution. 
The government made a submission to this effect to the Constitutional Review Commission. 
Considerable political pressure was the exerted on the commission to produce a report that 
endorsed the cabinet’s position, and also endorsed a constitutional change which allowed for a 
referendum on the issue to precede a parliamentary vote.  
The main political opposition to the third term came from NRM dissidents and 
opposition parliamentarians in the legislature. The Reform Agenda (RA) was a group that was 
made up of supporters of the first prominent NRM member to break ranks with Museveni, 
Kizza Besigye. Besigye left the movement and challenged Museveni in the presidential 
election of 2001, going on to lose after a fractious campaign in which he and his supporters 
were severely harassed. After the election he fled to exile in South Africa. Opposition 
members of parliament (drawn in the main from the Democratic Party and the Uganda 
People’s Congress) formed the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) in 2003 to fight the 
third term bid. The RA and PAFO merged in August 2004 to form the Forum for Democratic 
Change (FDC). This group led political efforts to counter what it members saw as Museveni’s 
anti-democratic tendencies. The FDC was registered as a political party in December 2004, 
after a legal battle to combat objections raised by front parties for the NRM.  
                                                 
26
 http://allafrica.com/stories/200306060682.html.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
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The harassment of opponents of the third term bill continued. Museveni henchman 
Kakoza Muthale was suspected of orchestrating a campaign of violence by youth militias to 
intimidate opponents of the bid,
27
 while opposition members of parliament Reagan Okumu 
and Michael Ocula, public opponents of the campaign, were arrested and charged with murder 
in 2005.  
The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2005 was presented to parliament by the Minister 
of  Justice and Constitutional Affairs in February 2005.  It proposed the repeal of presidential 
term limits and a referendum on the “no politics” system of government; the first to be 
decided by parliamentary vote and the second by national referendum.
28
  
The NRM ensured success in passing the legislation by gaining control of the critical 
committees that reviewed it - in particular the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee - 
and offering monetary incentives to its own parliamentarians to vote in favour of the bill. In 
addition NRM legislators managed to push through a change to the rules so that voting on the 
Constitutional Amendment Bill would be an open and not secret vote, making it extremely 
unlikely that MPS who had promised to vote for the amendment in public to follow their 
conscience in a secret ballot.   
The LPAC voted in favour of changing term limits in April 2005, and in July 2005 
parliament voted in favour of the Constitutional Amendment Bill. Museveni signed the bill 
into law in September 2005.
29
  
 
 
  
                                                 
27
 http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_10257.html.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
28
 http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=14321&no_cache=1.  Accessed 6-2-
2011.  
29
 http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Museveni-to-stand-for-3rd-term-20050929.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
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Nigeria 
Olesegun Obasanjo was Nigeria’s first democratically elected president after a long 
period of military rule, and an aborted democratic election in 1993. In July 2005 the National 
Political Conference met to recommend changes to the constitution merited by the new 
democratic dispensation. The conference voted to retain two terms of office for the president. 
However, this decision was overlooked by a Sub-committee in the Nigerian Senate that 
decided in November 2005 that the constitution should be changed to allow the state president 
and 26 state governors to stand for third terms.  
The Obasanjo third term campaign proceeded by stealth. His public statements on the 
matter and those delivered by his proxies did not say that he would not stand for a third term, 
but rather that he would respect the constitution of the country.  
Just as in the other countries with third term bids that we describe here, opposition 
within the ruling party came from party leaders with aspirations to the top job. Nigerian Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar was quoted as saying: “we have seen how tinkering with the 
constitution to allow for tenure elongation in some African countries led to sit-tight 
dictatorships.”30 In August 2005 Obasanjo accused Abubakar of disloyalty on television and  
Abubakar later publicly called for Obasanjo to resign over his third term bid.
31
  
The Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and other civil society and human 
rights bodies voiced their opposition to the third term campaign; it pitted the Nigerian Labour 
Congress  representing workers, against the Manufacturer’s Association of Nigeria whose 
chairman supported the bid.
32
  
Critically, the third term bid threatened to upset the unwritten agreement between 
Nigeria’s political elites of the unofficial rotation of executive power between the mainly 
Muslim north and predominantly Christian south of the country, and between the Yoruba, 
                                                 
30
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4923006.stm.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
31
 http://www.nairaland.net/mobile/thread.php?topic_id=73.  Accessed 6-2-2011.  
32
 http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_10550.html.  Accessed 2-2-11.  
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Hausa and Igbo ethnic groups, prompting fears of large-scale disruption in a country with a 
fractious history of federalism.
33
 BBC correspondent Alex Last, writing on April 19, 2006 on 
the third term debate in Nigeria, said that “one issue above all else has gripped Nigerian 
political life. It dominates the front pages of newspapers each day, and has done so for 
months.”34 
The amendment required the approval of supermajorities in both houses of the 
national assembly and 24 out of 36 states to pass.  Weeks of debate on the recommendations 
of the Senate subcommittee that suggested removing the presidential term limit ended on May 
16, 2006 when the Senate voted against the bill by voice vote, televised live. Although 
discussion continued in the lower house of parliament, this vote formally brought to an end 
legislative activity on the bill.
35
  
 
Founding Fathers and Liberators 
 We started this chapter with the observation that third term bids succeeded in countries 
where government legitimacy was strong and failed in those where government legitimacy 
was weak. In countries where the legitimacy of the government is high citizens feel that they 
are getting more democracy that they want. Given these conditions, we would expect third 
term campaigns in these countries not to be controversial. Conversely, in countries where the 
legitimacy of the government is low, citizens feel that they are not getting the democracy they 
want, and that the government is responsible for this democratic deficit. We might expect 
therefore third term bids in these countries to be controversial and generate a lot of 
opposition.  
 The course of the third term debates we described starting with Namibia, then Zambia, 
Malawi, Uganda and finally Nigeria, confirms these expectations. The third term campaigns 
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in Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia were strongly opposed by large mass publics, led by civil 
society groupings in an echo of the pro-democracy movements of not so long before. The 
intense focus of political activity and interest on the outcome of the bids, reflected the high 
stakes that were at play.  
 The third term campaigns in Namibia and Uganda were almost staid by 
comparison. Recall that earlier we wondered why presidential popularity was able to trump 
such high levels of opposition to one man rule in Uganda. Museveni became very popular in 
Uganda because he was able to bring peace and stability to a country that had experienced 
military dictatorship and civil war for many years. This change was especially marked in the 
rural areas.  At the same time, activities in civil society were also stifled, meaning that the 
Uganda did not have the kind of active civil society that existed in Malawi and Zambia. If we 
consider civil society to be a proxy for public opinion, in that civil society organizations voice 
the concerns of mass publics that are not ordinarily politically active, then in Uganda public 
opinion was actually not a factor in the political calculus of the resident as conceptualized in 
this thesis.   
Perhaps the critical factor in the impact of mass publics in Namibia and Uganda was 
the stature of presidents Sam Nujoma and Yoweri Museveni, respectively. Both were held in 
high regard, indeed reverence in some parts of the population, for bringing peace and stability, 
and liberation, to their countries. Although in Uganda it was not a liberation per se, but given 
the horrors of dictatorship and civil war the country had endured at the hands of Idi Amin and 
Milton Obote, its citizens might be forgiven for thinking that it was.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Summary of Findings 
We conclude this paper with a summary of the findings. We have shown that 
opposition to one-man rule, presidential approval and trust in the president aggregated at the 
country level have predictable effects on the outcomes of the third term bids that occurred in 
five African countries. 
The public opinion hypotheses that we generated predicted the correct outcome of 
these third term bids in four cases: Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria and Zambia. We only failed to 
predict the outcome of the third term bid in Uganda.  
While this paper has shown that public opinion is a good predictor of third term bid 
outcomes, the exceptionalism of the Uganda case reminds us of the importance of country 
contexts in determining the outcomes of third term bids.  
 
Implications  
Our analysis demonstrated that the reason that opposition to one-man rule, presidential 
popularity and trust in the president are such reliable predictors of the outcomes of third term 
bids is that they are substantively important markers of the demand for and supply of 
democracy at the country level.   
With the crest of the third wave of democratic transitions having passed, the focus of 
democratic scholarship has shifted to democratic consolidation, or the cementing of 
democratic regimes. Diamond (2007) argues that the central question of the field of 
democratic consolidation is the empirical question posed by Przeworski et al (1996): “what 
makes democracies endure.” The literature suggests that democratic consolidation can take 
place through institutionalisation, modernisation or legitimation. Though it may seem to be 
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stating the obvious that this study assumes that public opinion is politically important, this is 
significant, as it reflects on democratic consolidation. 
Does presidential respect for term limits in countries with high popular opposition to 
authoritarian rule provide evidence of the legitimation of the regime through popular consent, 
evidence that the consideration of public opinion is becoming routinised in the way that we 
associate with democratic regimes? Or, is it the institutionalisation of the disincentives 
represented by term limits that ensures they are respected by incumbent presidents? Using 
Bratton et al’s (2005) demand and supply model of democratic consolidation, we find that 
countries in which third term bids were unsuccessful are demand-driven democratic regimes 
while countries in which third term bids were successful are supply driven.  
This paper provides evidence to suggest that formal rules are being institutionalized 
and that democracy, represented by public opinion, the will of the people, is important. In 
only four out of sixteen cases, instances where an incumbent democratically elected president 
was in their second term and faced a constitutionally mandated term limit, was a third term 
bill to remove that limit introduced in parliament. The fact that these leaders followed 
constitutional procedures in seeking to stay on indicates, as Posner and Young (2007) argue, 
that formal rules have indeed taken root in Africa. Yet, in showing the importance of public 
opinion in determining the outcome of these bids this paper adds to the argument that Bratton 
(2007) makes for a continuing focus on the importance of informal rules in Africa’s hybrid 
regimes.    
Finally, we return to the normative sentiments that inspired this paper. The support for 
term limits in Africa’s mass publics is high; we can only hope that leaders continue to respect 
the will of the people so that presidential dictatorship can finally be consigned to the dustbin 
of Africa’s history.   
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
39 
 
Bibliography 
 
Baker, B. 2002, "Outstaying one's welcome: the presidential third-term debate in Africa", 
Contemporary Politics, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 285-301.  
Bayart, J. 1993, The state in Africa : the politics of the belly, Longman, London.  
Bratton, M. 2007, "Formal versus Informal Institutions in Africa", Journal of Democracy, vol. 
18, no. 3, pp. 96-110.  
Bratton, M., Mattes, R.B. & Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2005, Public opinion, democracy, and market 
reform in Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; New York.  
Bratton, M. & Van de Walle, N., 1997, Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions 
in comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.; New York, 
NY, USA.  
Bratton, M. & Walle, N.V.d. 1994, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in 
Africa", World Politics, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 453-489.  
Chabal, P., 1994, Power in Africa : an essay in political interpretation, St. Martin's Press, 
New York.  
Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. 1999, Africa works : disorder as political instrument, International 
African Institute in association with James Currey, Oxford ; Indiana University Press, 
[London]; Bloomington.  
Chazan, N., 1999, Politics and society in contemporary Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, Colo.  
Diamond, L. 2007 “The State of Democracy in Africa”, paper presented at Conference on 
Democratization in Africa: What Progress Towards Institutionalization? Ghana Centre 
for Democratic Development. 
Diamond, L. 2008, “The Rule of Law Versus the Big Man”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, 
no. 2, pp. 138-149.  
Hamilton, A., & Rossiter, C., 1961, The Federalist papers; Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, John Jay. New American Library, [New York.  
Herbst, J.I. 2000, States and power in Africa : comparative lessons in authority and control, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.  
Hyden, G., 2006, African politics in comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; New York.  
Jackson, R.H. & Rosberg, C.G. 1984, "Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa", 
Comparative Politics, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 421-442.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
40 
 
Joseph, R.A. 2008, "Challenges of a "Frontier" Region", Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, no. 
2, pp. 94-108.  
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. 1991, "His Eternity, His Eccentricity, or His Exemplarity? A Further 
Contribution to the Study of H. E. the African Head of State", African Affairs, vol. 90, 
no. 359, pp. 163-187.  
Linz, J.J. 1991, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 72-
84. 
Mamdani, M., 1996, Citizen and subject : contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.  
McKie, K. 2008, “The Politics of Adopting Term Limits in Sub-Saharan Africa”, paper 
presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Boston, MA. 
Nwabueze, B.O. 1974, Presidentialism in commonwealth Africa, C. Hurst & Co., London.  
Peabody, B.G. 2001, "George Washington, Presidential Term Limits, and the Problem of 
Reluctant Political Leadership", Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 439-
453.  
Posner, D.N. & Young, D.J. 2007, "The Institutionaliz tion of Political Power in Africa", 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 126-140.  
Prempeh, K. 2008, "Presidents Untamed", Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 109-123.  
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. 1996, "What Makes Democracies 
Endure?", Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 39-55.  
Roth, G. 1968, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States", 
World Politics, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 194-206.  
Southall, R., Melber, H., Human Sciences Research Council. Democracy and Governance 
Research Programme. & Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 2006, Legacies of power : leadership 
change and former presidents in African politics, HSRC Press ; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
; Distributed in North America by Independent Publishers Group, Cape Town, South 
Africa; Uppsala, Sweden; Chicago.  
Theobald, R. 1982, "Patrimonialism", World Politics, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 548-559.  
van de Walle, N. 2003, "Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa's emerging party systems", 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 297-321.  
VonDoepp, P. 2005, "Party Cohesion and Fractionalization in New African Democracies: 
Lessons from Struggles over Third-Term Amendments", Studies in Comparative 
International Development (SCID), vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 65-87.  
 
